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What can European leaders learn from Koizumi? 
Angel Ubide* 
 
Introduction 
During discussions about the global economy in 
Tokyo in late 2005, the most typical comment 
went as follows: “The global economy is doing 
fine, the US and Japan are strong, Europe is the 
only weak area at the moment.” That sentiment, 
to the ears of a European, gave much pause for 
thought. Wasn’t Japan just a few years ago a lost 
case, an example of all the policy mistakes that a 
country can make, the country of the ‘lost 
decade’? Wasn’t Europe to become the most 
vibrant and dynamic economic area of the world 
by 2010? What happened to achieve this reversal 
of fortunes in just a couple of years, to see a 
dynamic Japanese economy that is again 
attracting foreign investment and that it is starting 
again to invest around the world? What happened 
to Europe to become the sick man of the world, 
the economy that does not manage to grow above 
a declining potential growth rate despite ultra-
easy global liquidity conditions? 
Apart from some assorted differential shocks, 
what has happened is that Japan has taken 
economic reform seriously and has had a political 
leadership that has been willing to take risks to 
make it happen. 
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At the same time, Europe has lacked a serious 
commitment to reform. European leaders have recently 
taken the easy road of talking grandiosely about reforms 
to then linger and bicker and debate and finally deliver a 
much watered-down version of the original plan. By 
talking and not delivering, European leaders have 
generated ‘reform inflation’, devaluing the value of the 
concept of reform. In Japan, reform has had a positive 
impact on confidence while in Europe reform has become 
stigmatised among citizens. Europe needs a leader like 
Koizumi that can lead with a decisive reform agenda, 
with the proper sequence of actions and adequate delivery 
of promises, and who is willing to take political risks. We 
discuss below the process of Japanese reform and draw 
conclusions and lessons for European leaders. 
The sun rises again in Japan 
The Japanese economy recently reached a key milestone 
with core consumer price inflation reaching 0.1% on a 
year-on-year basis in November 2005, the first positive 
reading in over two years. With inflation expected to 
continue climbing gradually, the Bank of Japan (BoJ) 
will soon declare the end of the deflationary period and 
that the economy is on track to end its policy of 
quantitative easing and shift to an interest-rate targeting 
regime.  
Although the focus of markets and policy-makers is on 
the CPI, the reflation process extends to income and asset 
prices. The economic recovery is broad-based. Wages are 
rising alongside employment, contributing to the 
strongest labour income growth since the late 1990s. The 
improving labour market is anchored by strong business-
sector performance. Corporate profits have expanded for 
three straight years, lifting margins to historical highs. 
Sales growth is the strongest since the mid-1990s. The 
Centre for 
European 
Policy 
Studies  
CEPS Policy Brief
No. 97/March 2006
Abstract 
Following a long period of stagnation, Japan is growing again. The key to this success story is Koizumi’s 
relentless focus on structural reform, with two objectives: breaking the structural trap of political 
constituencies defending old and unproductive economic sectors; and adopting a two-pronged macro-
micro approach to make reform unavoidable. This paper argues that Europe should follow a similar 
strategy whereby financial market integration, and not the EU bureaucracy and grandiose political 
declarations, should become the main driving force of national economic reforms, pressuring 
liberalisation in goods and services markets and making labour market reforms unavoidable.  2 | Angel Ubide 
 
Bank of Japan’s Tankan survey shows that business 
confidence has risen to the highest levels since the early 
1990s. Japan’s gross domestic product could grow as 
much as 3% in 2006. 
Stronger income growth is mirrored in a broad-based turn 
in asset prices. Stock prices have doubled from the lows 
of early 2003. Land prices have stabilised, with gains 
increasingly widespread in large cities. Rising asset 
prices have bolstered bank balance sheets. BoJ data show 
that bank loans are growing (adjusted for write-offs and 
securitisation) at an increasingly rapid rate, accompanied 
by a pickup in money supply growth. 
After four years of stop-start growth, including a 
technical recession in 2004 recently wiped away by 
statistical revisions, it looks as if the Japanese economy 
really is on track for a sustainable recovery. In fact, Japan 
was the fastest-growing G7 country in late 2005.  
Several benign factors have come together to produce this 
happy turn of economic events, including rising demand 
for Japanese exports. But mostly, Junichiro Koizumi, the 
prime minister, and Heizo Takenaka, the internal affairs 
minister, who spearheaded Japan’s financial reforms and 
is now charged with privatising Japan Post, deserve 
credit. Koizumi’s greatest legacy is in the field of 
politics. By fighting the September 2005 general election 
on the issue of post office privatisation – and winning a 
big victory – he made economic reform respectable. 
More importantly, he shook up the ruling Liberal 
Democratic party. His victory accelerated the 
transformation of the LDP from a party run by powerful 
factions and beholden to conservative rural interests into 
a more modern and representative organisation. The one-
party rule in Japan is rather deceiving. In fact, Koizumi 
has achieved a very important revolution in the Japanese 
system of politics. By reforming the postal system and 
resisting the calls from within the LDP to water down or 
even stop the reform, Koizumi killed the main source of 
financing of local and regional political factions – Japan 
Post manages about 30% of all household savings, and 
these funds were mainly used to finance inefficient and 
wasteful public investment projects. And killing is not a 
bad word to use: in fact, Koizumi enlisted a group of 
young reformist leaders to beat the old-time LDP 
candidates in the September elections, and this group of 
leaders was called ‘the assassins’. 
Koizumi achieved his economic revolution by adopting a 
two-pronged approach. On the one hand, he expressed a 
clear determination to reform the economy, at almost any 
cost, and subordinated cyclical policies to this objective. 
Fiscal tightening was postponed and monetary policy, 
although independent, contributed by adopting the 
restoration of inflation as its main objective. On the other 
hand, and to complement this ‘macro’ top-down 
approach, Koizumi laid the ground for a simultaneous 
‘micro’ bottom-up approach, by making bank and 
corporate restructuring the centrepiece of its reform 
programme. By changing the incentives and objectives of 
the financial sector – this was the key of his programme, 
not the reduction of non-performing loans which was a 
by-product of this strategy – Koizumi’s strategy made 
economic reform unavoidable. The corporate sector was 
cut off from the traditional lines of politically-induced 
financing and had to reform or die. Thousands of zombie 
companies closed down and once all the dead wood had 
been eliminated and excess capacity removed, the 
economy was ready to start working again. It took more 
than 10 years for the Japanese authorities to realise that 
preserving the status quo was the road to perdition, that 
Japan had fallen into a structural trap,
1 which had to be 
broken in order to survive. But once they understood the 
problem they moved on to break the trap. The postal 
savings reform again exemplifies this, for it eliminates 
the distortions against private financial institutions – the 
Postal system does not pay deposit insurance premiums 
and enjoys tax free income - and should allow the 
relocation of capital towards more productive uses.  
What are the lessons for Europe? 
The Japanese strategy for reform can be summarised in 
two main ideas: 
  break the structural trap of political constituencies 
defending old and unproductive economic sectors;  
  adopt a two-pronged macro-micro approach to 
make reform unavoidable. 
In essence, it amounts to changing the incentive structure 
in the political and economic arenas. A review of the 
recent European experience suggests that Europe can 
certainly improve in these two areas.  
The European approach to reform was, in fact, designed 
precisely to avoid the structural trap. By designing a 
European bureaucratic superstructure to oversee reform, 
European leaders wanted to avoid the short-termism 
typically associated with government agendas catering to 
special interests, and force long-term reform plans onto 
national governments. The process of European 
integration would make reform unavoidable: the 
European competition policy and the single market 
process were designed precisely to slowly but surely 
eliminate efficiencies in the European market. In 
addition, the creation of the European Central Bank and 
the adoption of the Stability and Growth Pact were meant 
to indicate that countries surrendered their national policy 
sovereignty in order to give priority to medium-term 
issues such as price stability and long-term fiscal 
solvency.  
                                                        
1 A country falls into a structural trap when the interplay of 
long-term economic development incentives, politics and 
demographics prevents an economy from efficiently 
reallocating capital from low-return to high-return uses. See 
Robert H. Dugger and Angel Ubide (2004), “Structural 
Traps, Politics and Monetary Policy”, International 
Finance, 7:1, for a comprehensive discussion of structural 
traps and their implications for monetary policy. What can European leaders learn from Koizumi? | 3 
 
This model worked for several years but, at some point in 
the late 1990s, the effectiveness of the anti-structural trap 
devices faded and some European leaders started to hide 
behind grandiose declarations and the blurring of 
discipline that the euro delivered to undertake a populist 
domestic agenda. The disregard for the Stability and 
Growth Pact in some large European countries during the 
late 1990s was, in hindsight, a clear leading indication of 
their future intentions. The lack of progress with the 
Lisbon Agenda, the rejection of the services directive and 
the refusal to reform the CAP are just confirmations of 
the lack of true reform spirit in Europe. And they reveal 
that Europe is still in a structural trap: old sectors – 
agriculture, old workers – still exert too strong an 
influence over national politics, and national leaders are 
trying to escape the ‘macro’ disciplinary devices that the 
EU imposes over them. 
And here is where the second lesson from the Japanese 
experience is key. Even with a leader with a very strong 
commitment to reform, the dynamics of the electoral 
cycle imply that politically-driven reform is doomed to 
fail. A two-pronged approach, with micro reforms 
supporting the macro political pressure, is needed for a 
successful reform process. With this in mind, by focusing 
mainly on politically-driven labour market and welfare 
reforms, European leaders have got the sequencing of 
reforms wrong. Up to now, there have been plenty of 
labour market and social security reforms, some goods 
and services liberalisation, and little financial market 
integration. The sequence should have been precisely the 
opposite. Financial markets, and not the EU bureaucracy 
and grandiose political declarations, should have been the 
main driving force of national economic reforms, 
pressuring liberalisation in goods and services markets, 
which would finally make labour market reforms 
unavoidable.  
Thus, in addition to adopting a clear political 
commitment to reform, the most important reform 
European leaders need to foster is to accelerate the 
integration of EU financial markets, both by accelerating 
the implementation of the Financial Services Action Plan 
and by adopting national legislation that eliminates the 
lingering inefficiencies – such as the anachronistic Livret 
A in France, or opening up the ownership of the savings 
banks in France, Germany and Spain to allow for cross-
country mergers and more efficient integration of the 
European banking system. European consumers still pay 
too much for their banking services, and markets are not 
exerting enough discipline on the corporate sector, 
allowing inefficiencies to fester. Further, European 
consumers deserve to have access to an integrated 
mortgage market where fixed rate mortgages can easily 
and cheaply be refinanced. In this world of low inflation, 
low interest rates, low wage growth and high asset 
values, consumers deserve to be able to access the equity 
of their assets for current consumption. Europe’s 
potential growth rate would be lifted by these reforms, 
and the transmission mechanism of monetary policy 
would be shortened and made considerably more 
powerful. In addition, these reforms will not dent 
consumption in the near term and will transmit a badly-
needed positive message. 
Next, European leaders must urgently complete the single 
market in services. Financial market pressure, combined 
with aggressive trade liberalisation, should make this 
completion unavoidable. European leaders have here a 
unique opportunity to show their reformist credentials 
and present a convincing case for market liberalisation. 
If, as the recent WTO Hong Kong summit showed, 
European leaders continue to use trade policies to 
preserve the appearance of the European landscape rather 
than to foster the efficiency of European markets, the 
credibility of their reform agenda will sink. The strong 
defence of the Common Agricultural Policy and the 
arguments during the discussion of the EU budget over 
who wins and who loses – rather than over what is in the 
interest of Europe – are clear signals that Europe is still in 
a structural trap.  
Finally, in order to be able to accommodate the inflow of 
immigration needed to alleviate Europe’s demographic 
problem, the insiders/outsiders structure of European 
labour markets must be dismantled. The evidence shows 
that, regardless of the immigration policy model that is 
adopted, only countries that can provide adequate jobs for 
the immigrants and their children are successful in 
absorbing large waves of immigration. Thus, rather than 
adopting yet another type of flexible employment 
contract that will make the employment of the young and 
low skilled even more precarious, European leaders must 
face the unions and reduce the still rather high levels of 
job protection that the insiders enjoy in some countries. 
European leaders must move towards a welfare system 
that protects workers, not jobs. And this will be much 
easier if strong financial markets and integrated goods 
and services markets exert pressure on the social partners. 
Let’s not forget that Koizumi has cut the salaries of 
Japanese civil servants by over 40%, and that life-time 
employment has become the exception rather than the 
rule. Sacred cows can be killed. 
Conclusion 
As the recent experience in Japan shows, this sequence of 
reforms, properly explained and cast in a positive 
message, could make the European horizon much 
brighter. Thanks to Koizumi, Japanese citizens 
understood that delaying reform is a recipe for failure, 
and gave him a strong political endorsement last 
September. Now Japan is booming again, and despite the 
rather negative fiscal and demographic outlook, Japanese 
citizens are optimistic about their future and Japanese 
investors are increasing their risk-taking again. All the 
recent calls in Europe for more national ownership of the 
reform programmes amount to this: to ask the European 
leaders to successfully execute their own plans. Where is 
the European Koizumi?  C  E 
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